The fallacy of ontic entailment

The fallacy of ontic entailment consists in drawing ontological conclusions from epistemological convictions. There is an explanatory gap—an epistemic one—which means we cannot prove what we claim to know. But the epistemic gap in no way entails ontological conclusions: we exist and so does the world, irrespective of our epistemic limitations. And, strictly speaking, we can’t explicitly explain how we can know. This is a function of human finitude. So the two erroneous conclusions commonly drawn from the ‘fact’ of human finitude are that we can’t know the world and that the world itself is relative to our thinking and acting. Roughly.

The onto-epistemic circle

Ontology dictates epistemic practices and not vice versa. But we know what is (ontology) through epistemic practices, therefore neither can serve as foundation of the other. And neither can be taken up before the other. Therefore there is an iterative process at work between the two: the onto-epistemic circle. This is another example of the hermeneutic circle at work.

Postmodern postmortem

Postmodernism is a case of epistemic despair leading to ontological suicide.

Richard Rorty, the Pope: truth, ethics and relativisms

Pragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty gave one of his last public presentations in a 2005 lecture in Italy called “An ethics for today: finding common ground for philosophy and religion.” In his lecture Rorty contrasts his own view with that of the Catholic Church and clarifies his own understanding of relativism.

Rorty describes the Church as affirming the reality of a “structure of human existence, which can serve as a moral reference point.” For his part, Rorty sides with John Stuart Mill in holding that the only moral obligation humans have is that of “helping one another satisfy our desires, thus achieving the greatest possible amount of happiness.”[1] This clearly utilitarian ethic is one for which Rorty makes no apology. In the face of the Church’s view that utilitarianism makes animals of human beings, Rorty claims, in revealing phraseology, that on the contrary, “utilitarianism exalts us by offering us a challenging moral ideal. Utilitarianism leads to heroic and self-sacrificing efforts on behalf of social justice.”[2]

One must assume that the irony of his positive moral appraisal of heroism, self-sacrifice and social justice is not lost on Rorty who describes himself as a liberal ironist. But irrespective of whether Rorty acknowledges the strange juxtaposition of utilitarianism and moral virtues such as heroism, there is a clear appeal to moral values above and beyond, or at least additional to, that of increasing the net amount of happiness on the planet. While social justice might conceivably be defined in utilitarian terms as maximising human happiness or desire satisfaction, that is not the case with heroism and self-sacrifice. As normally understood, and when not distorted to fit a utilitarian scheme, one can imagine classic situations of heroism or self-sacrifice that neither increase net happiness nor were even intended to do so.

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