Heidegger talks of truth as unconcealment—Greek aletheia—and an essential part of his view is that along with uncovering there is always a covering up. So there is no possibility of raw truth, of full exposure.
No time for the reasons why but I think he's right; in short we are humans, we have our perspectives and ontologically we are part of that which is uncovered so the model of being an outside observer looking at the object that is the truth of something is not open to us.
So why this post? To offer a metaphor that may have (surely has?) been used before to help describe the concealment/unconcealment dynamic. It's a metaphor that is not unlike that of rebuilding the ship at sea, which serves epistemology as an alternative to foundationalism.
For Heidegger, truth is revealed just as an archeological dig reveals its object (he wouldn't use that word), but with a limitation: Imagine a dig constrained by its location, say jammed in a V between two cliffs and on the third side a river. There is ample space to work but nowhere to put the excavated material that is not also part of the site. And no, it can't be thrown in the river for fear of losing precious fragments.
So with painstaking effort soil is removed from one part of the dig to reveal what lies below but in the same process another part of the dig is covered. In the process of digging and moving and removing and uncovering only to cover over elsewhere, the diggers come to a fuller knowledge of the site—of the truth that they seek. But that truth will never be exposed fully for camera to take in as a whole. Yet truth it is, existent, partially covered, but known nevertheless.
Jun 20, 2013
Mar 19, 2013
The myth of the given?
My thesis: the world is objectively given but it is not given objectively.
Hence we can have truth without proof; we can live, love and die for causes without the certainty that the sceptic demands.
Hence we can have truth without proof; we can live, love and die for causes without the certainty that the sceptic demands.
Mar 6, 2013
Michael Polanyi’s tacit hermeneutic philosophy of science—for the layperson!
Recently a friend of mine by the name of skandalon (skandalon.net) gave a talk in the US. Here is the text of his talk.
The abstract for today’s talk makes some wild promises. I’ve
promised to talk of Martin Heidegger’s Being-in-the-world and Hans-Georg
Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics as well as making connections between them
and Michael Polanyi’s understanding of science. And I’ve promised to do so in a
way that is accessible to the layperson. We’ll see how we go!
I have decided that the best way forward is to let you in on a
conversation I had recently with a renowned biochemist and Nobel laureate. He’s
an Australian acquaintance who likes fishing and hunting crocodiles.
Professor Hermen E. Utic is responsible for a number of
significant advances in his field over the last 25 years. And he’s the
quintessential Polanyian scientist. He’s engaging to listen to; his eyes light
up as he talks of his research; and his passionate commitment to the search for
truth is obvious. Professor Utic is convinced that the secret to his success
lies in a combination of two things; firstly, his own innate attitudes,
abilities and personality; and secondly that he works for a university that
values theoretical research and gives him freedom to pursue possibilities where
they lead.
Utic enjoyed philosophy in his student years and says he
particularly enjoyed the renowned continental philosophers Martin Heidegger and
Hans-Georg Gadamer. But Professor Utic soon turned to science, somewhat
influenced by an Australian philosophical climate, which was not known for its
love of continental philosophy.
Given that some of the roots of Utic’s views on science lay
with the German philosophers of interpretation, it was there we had to start.
My personal experience of trying to read Heidegger and Gadamer decades ago was
not pleasant; I particularly found Heidegger convoluted, obscure, and I was not
at all convinced he was actually on to something. Talk of ‘Dasein’s
Being-in-the-world’ and speaking of ‘language as the house of being’ mystified
me.
As one wit said, analytic philosophers typically accuse the
continental ones of being insufficiently
clear, while the continental philosophers accuse the analytic ones of Being insufficiently. I hope today’s
talk is both clear and takes account of Being.
Anyway, I started by asking Professor Utic what it was that
he had learned from Heidegger and Gadamer. Here’s some of what he had to
say—though I should apologise for the recording quality; he’s a busy man so I
had to catch up with him at a cricket match as he was preparing to go in to bat.
Mar 1, 2013
Language and truth
Our choice of language is a matter of life or death because language creates candidates for truth.
Feb 27, 2013
The fallacy of ontic entailment
The fallacy of ontic entailment consists in drawing ontological conclusions from epistemological convictions. There is an explanatory gap—an epistemic one—which means we cannot prove what we claim to know. But the epistemic gap in no way entails ontological conclusions: we exist and so does the world, irrespective of our epistemic limitations. And, strictly speaking, we can’t explicitly explain how we can know. This is a function of human finitude. So the two erroneous conclusions commonly drawn from the ‘fact’ of human finitude are that we can’t know the world and that the world itself is relative to our thinking and acting. Roughly.
The onto-epistemic circle
Ontology dictates epistemic practices and not vice versa. But we know what is (ontology) through epistemic practices, therefore neither can serve as foundation of the other. And neither can be taken up before the other. Therefore there is an iterative process at work between the two: the onto-epistemic circle. This is another example of the hermeneutic circle at work.
Feb 20, 2013
Feb 5, 2013
Richard Rorty, the Pope: truth, ethics and relativisms
Pragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty gave one of his last public presentations in a 2005 lecture
in Italy called “An ethics for today: finding common ground for philosophy and religion.”
In his lecture Rorty contrasts his own view with that of the Catholic Church
and clarifies his own understanding of relativism.
Rorty describes the Church as affirming the reality of a “structure
of human existence, which can serve as a moral reference point.” For his part, Rorty
sides with John Stuart Mill in holding that the only moral obligation humans have
is that of “helping one another satisfy our desires, thus achieving the greatest
possible amount of happiness.”[1]
This clearly utilitarian ethic is one for which Rorty makes no apology. In the face
of the Church’s view that utilitarianism makes animals of human beings, Rorty claims,
in revealing phraseology, that on the contrary, “utilitarianism exalts us by offering
us a challenging moral ideal. Utilitarianism leads to heroic and self-sacrificing
efforts on behalf of social justice.”[2]
One must assume that the irony of his positive moral appraisal
of heroism, self-sacrifice and social justice is not lost on Rorty who describes
himself as a liberal ironist. But irrespective of whether Rorty acknowledges the
strange juxtaposition of utilitarianism and moral virtues such as heroism, there
is a clear appeal to moral values above and beyond, or at least additional to, that
of increasing the net amount of happiness on the planet. While social justice might
conceivably be defined in utilitarian terms as maximising human happiness or desire
satisfaction, that is not the case with heroism and self-sacrifice. As normally
understood, and when not distorted to fit a utilitarian scheme, one can imagine
classic situations of heroism or self-sacrifice that neither increase net happiness
nor were even intended to do so.
Mar 31, 2012
The varieties of non-religious belief and Alain de Botton’s "Religion for Atheists"
Published in The Melbourne Anglican April 2012
I wonder how many species of atheist you know? In the light of the Global Atheist Convention coming to Melbourne this month, I’m drawing up an atheist taxonomy to make sense of the varieties of non-religious belief. Until recently my neat pigeon-holing of atheism divided my non-believing friends—with no disrespect implied—into the mad and the sad. Let me explain…
The mad atheists typified by the so-called New Atheists, are those at the vanguard of the ‘God wars’ currently fomented by a conflict-crazed media. These people are led by biologist and science populariser Richard Dawkins, the ‘high priest’ of New Atheism and like Dawkins they are very, very angry at religion. Apart from their rage, they can be recognised by 4 further characteristics: their belief that religion is to blame for the world’s woes; their dogma that science is the one and only road to truth; their ability to quote Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy verbatim; and being early adopters of technology, they know that the new iPad is called the New iPad and not the iPad 3.
The sad atheists on the other hand are those who wrestle with the God question seriously. They know that the stakes are high and that without God it is notoriously difficult to make sense of the world or of human life or death or joy or justice or even, at the philosophical end of the spectrum, of truth itself. But despite the cost, the sad atheist is convinced that there is no One who might offer a well of life-giving meaning to quell our anxieties.
Such was my neat dichotomy of atheism until it was rent asunder by popular philosopher Alain de Botton. Unless you are mediaphobic you couldn’t have missed the recent visit to Australia of de Botton; he received copious coverage promoting his book, Religion for Atheists: A Non-believer’s Guide to the Uses of Religion. And it is de Botton who has forced me to expand my taxonomy, adding another category—the glad—to the mad and the sad.
I wonder how many species of atheist you know? In the light of the Global Atheist Convention coming to Melbourne this month, I’m drawing up an atheist taxonomy to make sense of the varieties of non-religious belief. Until recently my neat pigeon-holing of atheism divided my non-believing friends—with no disrespect implied—into the mad and the sad. Let me explain…
The mad atheists typified by the so-called New Atheists, are those at the vanguard of the ‘God wars’ currently fomented by a conflict-crazed media. These people are led by biologist and science populariser Richard Dawkins, the ‘high priest’ of New Atheism and like Dawkins they are very, very angry at religion. Apart from their rage, they can be recognised by 4 further characteristics: their belief that religion is to blame for the world’s woes; their dogma that science is the one and only road to truth; their ability to quote Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy verbatim; and being early adopters of technology, they know that the new iPad is called the New iPad and not the iPad 3.
The sad atheists on the other hand are those who wrestle with the God question seriously. They know that the stakes are high and that without God it is notoriously difficult to make sense of the world or of human life or death or joy or justice or even, at the philosophical end of the spectrum, of truth itself. But despite the cost, the sad atheist is convinced that there is no One who might offer a well of life-giving meaning to quell our anxieties.
Such was my neat dichotomy of atheism until it was rent asunder by popular philosopher Alain de Botton. Unless you are mediaphobic you couldn’t have missed the recent visit to Australia of de Botton; he received copious coverage promoting his book, Religion for Atheists: A Non-believer’s Guide to the Uses of Religion. And it is de Botton who has forced me to expand my taxonomy, adding another category—the glad—to the mad and the sad.
Feb 29, 2012
Why is Heidegger so obscure?
What Heidegger does by writing as he does is to remind us that the things of which he writes are not simple and so his writing points us to them and triggers our thinking about them. We then ask if his ambiguous utterances are the best we can do but we know they are far better than naive thinking that obscures the obscurity of Being.
Feb 24, 2012
The varieties of non-religious belief - Alain de Botton and Richard Rorty
Despite the New Atheists' denials that they are any sort of believers at all, atheist beliefs about God and religion seem to come in many varieties. I'm thinking of three: the mad, the glad and the sad.
The mad atheist (think Richard Dawkins' brand of New Atheism) is cranky as hell at religion; the glad atheist (think Alain de Botton and Richard Rorty--more below) floats through the godless life with nary a care for the issues at stake, and the sad atheist knows that the stakes are high but cannot believe in the One who might offer the ground of all being to quell our anxieties.
Currently I'm wrestling with two non-believers of the glad variety--Richard Rorty and Alain de Botton--similar in their conclusions although while de Botton takes a short cut, Rorty takes the long road via a lifetime of serious thinking.
I'm in the process of writing a review of de Botton's Religion for Atheists: A non-believer's guide to the uses of religion. (Published February 2012 by Hamish Hamilton.) RFA's first line is a shot over the bows of Dawkins and Co. as well as the seriously religious: "The most boring and unproductive question one can ask of any religion is whether or not it is true."
For de Botton, the tragedy of atheism is to have thrown out some of the wonderful trappings of religion with the dirty bathwater that consists of arguments about religious truth claims. "Of course no religions are true in any god-given sense," says de Botton in the second sentence of the book and then proceeds cheerily to ignore the question that serious thinkers, atheist and religious (and yes, fundamentalists on both sides too) think that matters.
More soon...
The mad atheist (think Richard Dawkins' brand of New Atheism) is cranky as hell at religion; the glad atheist (think Alain de Botton and Richard Rorty--more below) floats through the godless life with nary a care for the issues at stake, and the sad atheist knows that the stakes are high but cannot believe in the One who might offer the ground of all being to quell our anxieties.
Currently I'm wrestling with two non-believers of the glad variety--Richard Rorty and Alain de Botton--similar in their conclusions although while de Botton takes a short cut, Rorty takes the long road via a lifetime of serious thinking.
I'm in the process of writing a review of de Botton's Religion for Atheists: A non-believer's guide to the uses of religion. (Published February 2012 by Hamish Hamilton.) RFA's first line is a shot over the bows of Dawkins and Co. as well as the seriously religious: "The most boring and unproductive question one can ask of any religion is whether or not it is true."
For de Botton, the tragedy of atheism is to have thrown out some of the wonderful trappings of religion with the dirty bathwater that consists of arguments about religious truth claims. "Of course no religions are true in any god-given sense," says de Botton in the second sentence of the book and then proceeds cheerily to ignore the question that serious thinkers, atheist and religious (and yes, fundamentalists on both sides too) think that matters.
More soon...
Nov 18, 2011
Who am I? according to "Being and Time"
Another naively simplistic encapsulation of Heidegger in one sentence; this time his core idea of Being and Time which is pointed to in its title: Who I am (present) is possibilities (future) interpreted through history (past).
So Heidegger says of the human person, Dasein: "Its own past is not something which follows along after Dasein, but something which already goes ahead of it." (Being and Time, 1962, p.41)
Disclaimer: I am not a Heidegger scholar. Just a reader.
So Heidegger says of the human person, Dasein: "Its own past is not something which follows along after Dasein, but something which already goes ahead of it." (Being and Time, 1962, p.41)
Disclaimer: I am not a Heidegger scholar. Just a reader.
Nov 17, 2011
Heidegger in 4 words: Everything isn't a thing
That's it really. Heidegger in 4 words. Five if you're pedantic. Everything isn't a thing. And if we think that everything is a thing then we use 'thing' language and think 'thingfully.' Rule number one of living an ontologically virtuous life is not to be thingful.
And (hypothetically) if there is reality that is not describable as a thing or things then if we use thing language we will reinforce the cover-up of all that reality.
And (hypothetically) if in fact it's the 'non-thing' reality that grounds all of what we think of as things, then we are in trouble as far as having any sort of adequate understanding of the world.
Hence Heidegger's dislike of ontotheology which makes God too a thing, reducing God to human thing-type ways of thinking and understanding.
In its attempt to know the world philosophy has covered up Being itself; it has squeezed the world into its own mould but in doing so has distorted our understanding of reality.
So, according to Heidegger, his phenomenological approach is the only way of access to the most basic levels of reality. Why? Because it offers the only means of avoiding thinking of the world as so many entities understood and dealt with in the ways that the history of Western philosophy has dictated.
Heidegger expresses it this way (in an uncharacteristically clear sentence, at least for those who have read some of his work):
Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task. (Being and Time, 1962, p.31)
And (hypothetically) if there is reality that is not describable as a thing or things then if we use thing language we will reinforce the cover-up of all that reality.
And (hypothetically) if in fact it's the 'non-thing' reality that grounds all of what we think of as things, then we are in trouble as far as having any sort of adequate understanding of the world.
Hence Heidegger's dislike of ontotheology which makes God too a thing, reducing God to human thing-type ways of thinking and understanding.
In its attempt to know the world philosophy has covered up Being itself; it has squeezed the world into its own mould but in doing so has distorted our understanding of reality.
So, according to Heidegger, his phenomenological approach is the only way of access to the most basic levels of reality. Why? Because it offers the only means of avoiding thinking of the world as so many entities understood and dealt with in the ways that the history of Western philosophy has dictated.
Heidegger expresses it this way (in an uncharacteristically clear sentence, at least for those who have read some of his work):
Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task. (Being and Time, 1962, p.31)
Mar 18, 2010
The secret police will never get me
"The secret in the poet's heart remains unknown to the secret police,
despite their ability to predict his every thought, utterance, and
movement by monitoring the cerebroscope which he must wear day and
night. We can know which thoughts pass through a man's head without
understanding them. Our inviolable uniqueness lies in our poetic
ability to say unique and obscure things, not in our ability to say
obvious things to ourselves alone."
Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p.123
despite their ability to predict his every thought, utterance, and
movement by monitoring the cerebroscope which he must wear day and
night. We can know which thoughts pass through a man's head without
understanding them. Our inviolable uniqueness lies in our poetic
ability to say unique and obscure things, not in our ability to say
obvious things to ourselves alone."
Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p.123
Mar 12, 2010
The Rise of Atheism
There's an interesting convention on in Melbourne Australia this weekend. A global meeting of atheists led by Richard Dawkins. It is being covered by a blog on the ABC website. It will be interesting to see if the convention rings with the tones Alister McGrath attributes to the new atheists in his book The Twilight of Atheism:
Western atheism now finds itself in something of a twilight zone. Once a worldview with a positive view of reality, it seems to have become a permanent pressure group, its defensive agenda dominated by concerns about limiting the growing political influence of religion.
Dec 2, 2009
Gadamer, Polanyi and relativism (A recent presentation)
Michael Dummet (plagiarising Kant) calls it “the scandal of philosophy,” that philosophy has no systematic methodology, while Richard Bernstein says the following:
It is an interesting accident of history that in the space of a couple of years in the mid 20th century, two of the most significant critiques of the Enlightenment dream of certain knowledge and neutral objectivity were published. Michael Polanyi’s Personal Knowledge in 1958 and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Truth and Method in 1960. Yet apparently neither author was significantly influenced by the other.
For Polanyi, once one of the world’s leading physical chemists, the focus of his attention is the knowledge that comes from the natural sciences, while for Gadamer the project is about human understanding, the object of which ranges from history and texts to art and music.
Today I will explore some parallels between Polanyi’s epistemology and Gadamerian hermeneutics, focussing particularly on aspects relevant to the charges of relativism levelled against them.
Hovering in the background of this pursuit [of turning philosophy into a rigorous science] is what might be called ‘the Cartesian Anxiety’—the fear or apprehension that if there are no … basic constraints, no foundations, no determinate ‘rules of the game’, then we are confronted with intellectual and moral chaos where anything goes.Today I want to consider two thinkers who have overcome their Cartesian anxiety, but who emphatically do not believe that anything goes. The question I am working on in my doctoral studies is whether they are successful in holding on to a sensible notion of truth without either falling backwards into Cartesian neurosis or tripping over their own feet into the relativist puddle.
It is an interesting accident of history that in the space of a couple of years in the mid 20th century, two of the most significant critiques of the Enlightenment dream of certain knowledge and neutral objectivity were published. Michael Polanyi’s Personal Knowledge in 1958 and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Truth and Method in 1960. Yet apparently neither author was significantly influenced by the other.
For Polanyi, once one of the world’s leading physical chemists, the focus of his attention is the knowledge that comes from the natural sciences, while for Gadamer the project is about human understanding, the object of which ranges from history and texts to art and music.
Today I will explore some parallels between Polanyi’s epistemology and Gadamerian hermeneutics, focussing particularly on aspects relevant to the charges of relativism levelled against them.
Oct 2, 2009
Heidegger made easy for the masses
I am working on a mass-market piece on the extraordinary Martin
Heidegger. "Heidegger made easy" if such a thing is possible. The current draft was here but I've posted it elsewhere so you can now find it here.
Heidegger. "Heidegger made easy" if such a thing is possible. The current draft was here but I've posted it elsewhere so you can now find it here.
Hans-Georg Gadamer
Sep 30, 2009
Padding the case for the new atheism
Mark Shea's article on the new atheists is copied below. It talks tacitly of tacit knowledge. The source is here.
Padding the Case for the New Atheism
Recently there has been a flurry of books from the “New Atheists.” Such figures as Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, Daniel Dennett, and Christopher Hitchens have been holding forth to state . . . well, not anything new.
The reason there is nothing new to say is that there cannot, by the nature of the discussion, be anything new to say. When it came to the question “Does God exist?,” St. Thomas could only think of two reasonable objections in the whole history of human thought.
Padding the Case for the New Atheism
Recently there has been a flurry of books from the “New Atheists.” Such figures as Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, Daniel Dennett, and Christopher Hitchens have been holding forth to state . . . well, not anything new.
The reason there is nothing new to say is that there cannot, by the nature of the discussion, be anything new to say. When it came to the question “Does God exist?,” St. Thomas could only think of two reasonable objections in the whole history of human thought.
Sep 16, 2009
Prophetic words?
Chris Hedges has an impressive pedigree and a cutting cultural critique. His latest book is Empire of Illusion: The end of literacy and the triumph of spectacle, a penetrating book that begins with window on world championship wrestling. A short interview with Hedges is here on YouTube.
Sep 15, 2009
The true and the pseudo problems of knowledge
The 'problem of knowledge' has traditionally been about the question of whether we can know anything certainly and if so how we can justify that knowledge. It is based on an inside-outside view which sees us (me: the knower) as a subject separated from the thing known which is the object of my knowledge.
Heidegger says that this subject-object separation assumes a subject which is not in the world of the objects that are known. As if one could put oneself on one side of a line and all things to be known on the other side. But this separation is just not the way the world is (our world: the world we live in and experience and cannot escape from). In Heidegger's language we are always and already in the world. We already know before we start to think of the so called problem of knowledge. But even more: we could not even dream up this wrong way of thinking about the question if we weren't already involved in knowing.
So if the 'old' problem of knowledge is a pseudo problem, the true problem according to Heidegger, is this: how do we, who cannot help being totally caught up in knowing the world, how do we disclose the world in which we already are? (History of the Concept of Time p.162)
Mmm... I think this could be clearer.
Heidegger says that this subject-object separation assumes a subject which is not in the world of the objects that are known. As if one could put oneself on one side of a line and all things to be known on the other side. But this separation is just not the way the world is (our world: the world we live in and experience and cannot escape from). In Heidegger's language we are always and already in the world. We already know before we start to think of the so called problem of knowledge. But even more: we could not even dream up this wrong way of thinking about the question if we weren't already involved in knowing.
So if the 'old' problem of knowledge is a pseudo problem, the true problem according to Heidegger, is this: how do we, who cannot help being totally caught up in knowing the world, how do we disclose the world in which we already are? (History of the Concept of Time p.162)
Mmm... I think this could be clearer.
Sep 14, 2009
Heidegger no realist but enjoys honey for breakfast
In Being and Time (Section 44) Martin Heidegger does not want to be identified as a realist. But he does not question the reality of the external world. And there's the issue: the reason he does not question it, is not that he is not interested in questioning it, or because he already has the answer to that question, or because it is a question that is too hard to answer. The reason that he does not ask whether the external world exists is because he thinks that is an "inappropriate formulation of the question."
So what does Heidegger mean by 'realist' if he is not one and yet he does not deny the existence of what he calls 'entities within-the-world'?
Heidegger says his view differs from every kind of realism because "realism holds that the Reality of the 'world' not only needs to be proved but also is capable of proof." Wrong on both counts says MH. He says that realism, which thinks in this way, has got the structure of of reality wrong in the first place and then with that wrong structure in mind, it asks its question. More soon...
Meanwhile, while listening to Heidegger expert, Hubert Dreyfus, (on free mp3 lectures) it was encouraging to hear him say that for 30 years he has been wrestling with Heidegger's views on realism and still isn't sure he has understood him correctly.
So what does Heidegger mean by 'realist' if he is not one and yet he does not deny the existence of what he calls 'entities within-the-world'?
Heidegger says his view differs from every kind of realism because "realism holds that the Reality of the 'world' not only needs to be proved but also is capable of proof." Wrong on both counts says MH. He says that realism, which thinks in this way, has got the structure of of reality wrong in the first place and then with that wrong structure in mind, it asks its question. More soon...
Meanwhile, while listening to Heidegger expert, Hubert Dreyfus, (on free mp3 lectures) it was encouraging to hear him say that for 30 years he has been wrestling with Heidegger's views on realism and still isn't sure he has understood him correctly.Sep 12, 2009
Tacitus' rules. OK?
Rule #1: Keep it simple
If something is worth saying, then it is worth saying clearly, concisely and in words of few syllables. This site is for laypersons, not just philosopho-persons or theologo-persons. If philosophers and theologians cannot speak with laypeople about things that matter, then perhaps they don't matter so much after all.
Maybe it is asking the impossible, but the content of this site should be serious but fascinating, simple but profound. "Escribir es pensar con claridad" said Jorge Ibargüengoitia, which means very little if you don't speak Spanish. "To write is to think clearly."
More thoughts on simply writing and avoiding 'weasel words' will soon be found at Tacitus' thoughts on writing well.
Rule #2: Keep it friendly
Please contribute to the dialogue vigorously but politely. Remember the two pitfalls of the net: it is faceless and fast. It is easy to misunderstand people, to be rude to them, and to do both before you have had time to say, “I think it’s time for elevenses.”
A dialogue is only worth having when both partners listen with respect, and speak with humility. So be it! Or be censored, censured or sent packing.
Rule #3: About blogs, comments and articles
The aim of a blog entry and the comments that follow it, is to conduct a discussion in byte sized chunks. Longer articles will be posted elsewhere with links to the relevant blog. See the articles index for more.
If something is worth saying, then it is worth saying clearly, concisely and in words of few syllables. This site is for laypersons, not just philosopho-persons or theologo-persons. If philosophers and theologians cannot speak with laypeople about things that matter, then perhaps they don't matter so much after all.
Maybe it is asking the impossible, but the content of this site should be serious but fascinating, simple but profound. "Escribir es pensar con claridad" said Jorge Ibargüengoitia, which means very little if you don't speak Spanish. "To write is to think clearly."
More thoughts on simply writing and avoiding 'weasel words' will soon be found at Tacitus' thoughts on writing well.
Rule #2: Keep it friendly
Please contribute to the dialogue vigorously but politely. Remember the two pitfalls of the net: it is faceless and fast. It is easy to misunderstand people, to be rude to them, and to do both before you have had time to say, “I think it’s time for elevenses.”
A dialogue is only worth having when both partners listen with respect, and speak with humility. So be it! Or be censored, censured or sent packing.
Rule #3: About blogs, comments and articles
The aim of a blog entry and the comments that follow it, is to conduct a discussion in byte sized chunks. Longer articles will be posted elsewhere with links to the relevant blog. See the articles index for more.
Sep 11, 2009
Contact Tacitus
Tacitus is electronically reserved, technologically challenged, cyber shy, and fearful of non-physical spaces. But here's a photo to get you acquainted.
Tacitus does use email. That's: TacitusM at gmail full stop then com.
Tacitus' project
Tacitus’ research starts with the philosopher Richard Rorty, an advocate of relativism. Rorty believes that knowledge is culturally constructed rather than universally true. (Is that true? Really?)
Tacitus disagrees with Rorty. Tacitus thinks that science, as well as other disciplines such as theology, morality and aesthetics, can all make truth claims. But no claims to truth escape the fact that we are always and inevitably caught up in the very world that we want to know about.
The implication of this is that all knowing is a circular process—an interpretive process. But it’s not a vicious circle. If you enjoy the technical jargon, Tacitus' research is largely about hermeneutics.
Tacitus is attracted by the Continental philosophical tradition which challenges the error of seeing and talking about the world in terms of distinct subjects and objects. The problem with that idea is that it assumes we can separate ourselves from ‘the world’.
Tacitus is also attracted to analyses of science that question the ideals of certainty and proof. These ideals don’t hold philosophical water and they lead to a view that only science is on about truth.
But Tacitus is not a relativist about scientific knowledge. For example, Tacitus believes there is good reason to think that human activity causes climate change. But that doesn’t mean we can expect final proof or certainty in the matter.
So, in the face of Rorty's relativism, Tacitus wants to say that in both science and 'non-science', we arrive at knowledge in a similar way, a hermeneutic way. And part of that knowledge lies beyond explicit explanation. It is tacit knowledge. For an example of tacit knowledge, just think of how you recognized your mother’s face long before you could talk.
You may have heard echoes above of the voices of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Michael Polanyi. Tacitus is pretty keen on them. Gadamer was a philosopher who wrote about truth in the human sciences. Polanyi was a scientist who turned to philosophy of science because he was concerned about the way so called scientific knowledge was misunderstood.
Do Gadamer and Polanyi have the resources to take on Rorty? If we go on feeding Tacitus honey sandwiches for the next year or two then he/she will finish his/her research and we might know the answer.
Tacitus disagrees with Rorty. Tacitus thinks that science, as well as other disciplines such as theology, morality and aesthetics, can all make truth claims. But no claims to truth escape the fact that we are always and inevitably caught up in the very world that we want to know about.
The implication of this is that all knowing is a circular process—an interpretive process. But it’s not a vicious circle. If you enjoy the technical jargon, Tacitus' research is largely about hermeneutics.
Tacitus is attracted by the Continental philosophical tradition which challenges the error of seeing and talking about the world in terms of distinct subjects and objects. The problem with that idea is that it assumes we can separate ourselves from ‘the world’.
Tacitus is also attracted to analyses of science that question the ideals of certainty and proof. These ideals don’t hold philosophical water and they lead to a view that only science is on about truth.
But Tacitus is not a relativist about scientific knowledge. For example, Tacitus believes there is good reason to think that human activity causes climate change. But that doesn’t mean we can expect final proof or certainty in the matter.
So, in the face of Rorty's relativism, Tacitus wants to say that in both science and 'non-science', we arrive at knowledge in a similar way, a hermeneutic way. And part of that knowledge lies beyond explicit explanation. It is tacit knowledge. For an example of tacit knowledge, just think of how you recognized your mother’s face long before you could talk.
You may have heard echoes above of the voices of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Michael Polanyi. Tacitus is pretty keen on them. Gadamer was a philosopher who wrote about truth in the human sciences. Polanyi was a scientist who turned to philosophy of science because he was concerned about the way so called scientific knowledge was misunderstood.
Do Gadamer and Polanyi have the resources to take on Rorty? If we go on feeding Tacitus honey sandwiches for the next year or two then he/she will finish his/her research and we might know the answer.
About Tacitus
Tacitus is a somewhat mature-age student returning to study after years of other pursuits. Once upon a time Tacitus studied engineering and philosophy and later theology.
Tacitus enjoys teaching and has taught in the natural sciences, philosophy and theology at tertiary level in two countries and two languages.
Tacitus also read Winnie the Pooh in Cambridge when we were very young.
Currently Tacitus is researching the relationship between scientific and theological knowledge. There's more on that at Tacitus' project.
Tacitus enjoys teaching and has taught in the natural sciences, philosophy and theology at tertiary level in two countries and two languages.
Tacitus also read Winnie the Pooh in Cambridge when we were very young.
Currently Tacitus is researching the relationship between scientific and theological knowledge. There's more on that at Tacitus' project.
First blog-Why are we here?
Certainty is out. Belief is here to stay. Despite religious and atheist fundamentalisms, Benjamin Franklin was right: nothing is certain but death and taxes. Which leaves us believing a lot more than we know for certain.
A note from Tacitus' mentor This blog, owned by the inscrutable Tacitus K, is dedicated to a discussion of what philosophers call ontology, epistemology and theology. AKA: what is, how we know, and where religion fits into the mix. The idea is to have a serious but non-technical chat: science, faith and truth in conversation.
Tacitus' broad ranging blog, serves two purposes: it encourages Tacitus to write (which will also make Tacitus think), and it will provoke discussion, which will make Tacitus think some more. All of which is a 'good thing' as Pooh Bear would say. Tiddly Pom.
Sincerely,
Tacitus' Mentor
A note from Tacitus' mentor This blog, owned by the inscrutable Tacitus K, is dedicated to a discussion of what philosophers call ontology, epistemology and theology. AKA: what is, how we know, and where religion fits into the mix. The idea is to have a serious but non-technical chat: science, faith and truth in conversation.Tacitus' broad ranging blog, serves two purposes: it encourages Tacitus to write (which will also make Tacitus think), and it will provoke discussion, which will make Tacitus think some more. All of which is a 'good thing' as Pooh Bear would say. Tiddly Pom.
Sincerely,
Tacitus' Mentor
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